Recent years have witnessed ongoing research and policy debate as regards the extension of mortgage credit to underserved, minority, and higher credit-risk populations. In part, analyses have derived from articulated polices of both the Clinton and Bush Administrations, which have sought to advance the homeownership opportunities of underserved and minority groups.
Research accordingly has sought to identify the determinants of persistent disparities in both mortgage origination and homeownership attainment among targeted and non-targeted groups, (see, for example, Painter, Gabriel and Myers [2001] , Coulson [1999] , Deng, Quigley and Van
Order [1996] , Rosenthal [2001] ). On the mortgage side, studies largely have focused on the role of borrower credit risk and credit constraint in the analysis of mortgage loan origination and performance (see, for example, Ambrose and Capone [1998, 2000] , Ondrich, Ross and Yinger [2000] , Berkovec, Canner, Gabriel, and Hannon [1998] , Avery et al [1996] , Goering and Wienk [1996] , Munnell et al [1996] , Canner, Passmore and Smith [1994] , Gabriel and Rosenthal [1991] ).
While prior studies have provided substantial evidence of elevated default risk among lowerincome, minority, and less credit-worthy mortgage borrowers, there exists little evidence as to any offset of those risks via the slower prepayment speeds of underserved borrower groups. To mortgage lenders and investors, such an offset could serve to appreciably reduce total loan termination probabilities so as to boost investment returns. Indeed, analyses of loan termination probabilities should account for the joint and competing nature of borrower prepayment and default option exercise (see, for example, Deng, Quigley, and Van Order [2000] ).
Recent studies of the micro-foundations of mortgage loan performance suffer from numerous limitations, however, in the assessment of prepayment and default risks. Most prior analyses fail to include contemporaneous valuation of the mortgage put and call options over the life of the mortgage; further, many analyses have focused on prediction of mortgage default without consideration of prepayment risk and vice-versa (see, for example, Berkovec et al [1998] , Avery et al [1996] , Gabriel and Rosenthal [1991] , and Pennington-Cross and Nichols [2000] ). Recent papers (see, for example, Cotterman [2001] , Deng, Quigley and Van Order [1996, 2000] , Deng and Quigley [2001] , Archer, Ling and McGill [2001] , and Van Order and Zorn [2001] ) often fail to include important information on borrower creditworthiness (credit scores) and are further circumscribed by the limited availability of other borrower, loan, and locational information important to prediction of loan performance, including indicators of borrower wealth, mortgage payment-to-income and debt-to-income ratios, and other common underwriting controls.
This study applies a competing risk framework to model the micro-foundations of FHAinsured mortgage performance. The FHA data are well suited to analyses of loan default, given the inclusion in the program of large numbers of relatively higher credit risk borrowers. The data further enable an assessment of whether those same higher credit risk and underserved borrowers prepay their mortgages more slowly, due perhaps to problems of access to mortgage finance, difficulties in mortgage qualification, limited borrower knowledge of mortgage refinance opportunities, or reduced residential mobility. To the extent the prepayment risk of mortgages originated among lower-income, lower credit-quality, and minority borrowers is relatively damped, it should be reflected in the pricing of those loans. Indeed, from a mortgage pricing perspective, the reduced prepayment risk associated with those FHA-insured borrower groups may serve to mitigate their higher default probabilities.
The analysis employs an option-based hazard model to simultaneously assess the competing risks of FHA-insured mortgage default and prepayment. The empirical model derives from option theory and employs well-specified contemporaneous proxies for the mortgage put and call options in the default and prepayment equations. Given the availability of high quality micro data, the estimating equations control for borrower credit worthiness (credit scores) and other common underwriting variables among the approximately 30 contemporaneous and timeinvariant indicators of borrower, loan, and locational risk.
Results of the analysis strongly support the predictions of option theory in explaining the exercise of default and prepayment options among FHA-insured mortgage borrowers. The estimates confirm that the intrinsic values of the call and put option variables are positive and highly significant in the exercise of the prepayment and default options; respectively. Results further suggest that a higher value of the put option (probability of negative equity) reduces the risk of mortgage prepayment.
Research findings further point to the importance of other borrower, loan, and market characteristics in the estimation of mortgage termination risks. As would be expected, higher credit score borrowers are less likely to exercise the default option, whereas lower credit score borrowers are less likely to prepay. In that regard, the 5-year cumulative probability of prepayment is about 10 percentage points higher among borrowers with scores in excess of 680 than among those with scores below 620. The 5-year cumulative prepayment probabilities of Black and Hispanic borrowers are about 14 and 7 percentage points lower than those of white borrowers, respectively.
Overall, results indicate the appropriateness of the competing risk specification and illustrate the importance of slower prepayment speeds among higher credit risk and underserved borrowers. As is evidenced below, the substantially elevated default probabilities of higher credit risk FHA borrowers are more than offset by their damped prepayment propensities, resulting in significantly lower loan termination probabilities overall. Indeed, the estimated cumulative probability of mortgage termination at five years post-origination among high default risk FHA borrowers (42 percent) is only 3/4ths that of low-default risk FHA borrowers (55 percent).
Lender and investor recognition of this mortgage performance advantage should facilitate their greater willingness to originate and acquire higher credit-risk FHA-insured loans and at more competitive prices. Research findings suggest that the extension of mortgage credit to less creditworthy and underserved borrowers, in a manner consistent with their lower termination risks, would serve to advance both their homeownership attainment and related federal housing policy objectives.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section I presents the basic model and estimation strategy. Section II describes the FHA database whereas section III discusses estimation and simulation results. Conclusions and implications for mortgage pricing are discussed in section IV.
I. Methodology
Recent research on mortgage markets indicates that borrower exercise of mortgage prepayment and default options are behaviorally distinct, but not independent. For example, one cannot calculate accurately the economic value of the default option without considering simultaneously the financial incentive for prepayment (Deng, Quigley, and Van Order [2000] ).
Furthermore, risk preferences and other idiosyncratic differences may vary widely across borrowers. Appropriate modeling of prepayment and default risks is then crucial to the pricing of mortgages and to an understanding of the economic behavior of homeowners.
This analysis applies a proportional hazard framework to assess the competing risks of mortgage termination by prepayment and default. The model derives from option theory and predicts that well-informed mortgage borrowers in a perfectly competitive market will exercise the default or prepayment option in order to increase their wealth. Theory suggests that mortgage borrowers will exercise the default option when the market value of the mortgage equals or exceeds the market value of the collateral. Similarly, borrowers can increase their wealth by refinancing their loans when the market value of the mortgage exceeds the par value of the mortgage. However, these two options compete against each other. For example, when an individual decides to exercise the default option, she is making the decision to forego future exercise of the prepayment option. Kau et al (1992 Kau et al ( , 1995 
In this formulation Typically, we cannot measure directly from the micro data the extent to which the default option is "in the money" without knowing the entire path of individual house values. We can, however, estimate the probability of exercise of the "put option" based on the initial loan-to-value ratio and the diffusion process of house prices. Specifically, the "put option" variable is defined as:
where ( γ jk are parameters of the baseline hazard function. The baseline may be estimated with a flexible form suggested by Han and Hausman (1990) , such that:
Alternatively, the form of the baseline may be imposed by employing mortgage industry performance benchmarks such as those reflected in the "PSA and SDA curves."
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The estimated competing risks of prepayment and default are then used to simulate the potential risks to FHA mortgage lending as derived from various borrower and loan characteristics, notably including loan-to-value and payment-to-income ratios as well as borrower liquid assets and credit scores. Further simulations are undertaken for hypothetically comprised high-and low-credit risk borrower groups. As indicated below, total loan terminations from default and prepayment among higher credit risk borrowers are estimated to be substantially less than those of low credit risk borrowers, suggesting enhanced investor profitability of those loans when such prepayment option is "in the money".
II. Data
The principal data utilized in this study consist of a large random sample of FHA-insured home purchase loans originated during the 1992-1996 period. The final sample consists of 12,012 loans randomly selected from the 120,342 endorsed loans applications from 1992, 1994, and 1996. Loan origination dates are concentrated in those three calendar years but also spread out into other years. The 120,342 loan database provided by Unicon Research is a choice-based sample with weights that account for choice-based sampling and differential loan losses by race and loan status. For each of the application years, the weighted cumulative default rates for the loans comprising the sub-sample of 12,012 loans were found to be quite similar to those observed in the parent population. The individual loan files are observed on a monthly basis from month of origination through that of termination, maturation, or through the end of 2000 for active loans. 5 As defined for this analysis, default outcomes include both lender foreclosure and situations where the borrower conveys title of the property in lieu of foreclosure. Loan prepayment is defined as pay-off prior to completion of the amortization period. 6 Borrower credit score information is provided by Equifax and Trans Union. If the data provides both Equifax and Trans Union scores for an individual borrower, we take the average of the two scores. Numerous recent papers (see, for example, Avery et al [1996] ) point to the importance of controls for borrower credit score in micro-analyses of mortgage default likelihoods.
assessment of race-related effects associated with the performance of FHA-insured loans. The FHA data set encompasses nearly 300 different metropolitan areas, allowing for substantial variability in the structure of local lending markets.
The FHA-insured data are well-suited to analyses of loan performance, given the inclusion in the program of large numbers of relatively high credit-risk borrowers. Although both FHA and conventional mortgage applications are evaluated according to formal underwriting criteria, the FHA guidelines are less strict than those of conventional lenders, particularly as regards downpayment requirements and the acceptable ratios of housing expense-to-income and total debt expense-to-income. Approximately 61 percent of the loans in the sample have loan-to-value ratios exceeding 95%. Similarly, the debt obligation ratios of the FHA borrowers in the sample are relatively high, averaging about 35% for the ratio of total debt payments-to-income and about 23% for the ratio of housing debt payments-to-income. First-time homebuyers and moderateincome borrowers comprise a large portion of the sample, and minorities are well represented as well. Table 1 displays the means and variances of the time-invariant covariates, whereas Table 2 provides the same for time-varying covariates at origination and termination. As is evidenced in Table 1 , some two-thirds of FHA borrowers were first-time buyers; the average mortgage loan-tovalue ratio among sampled loans was 94 percent. As would be expected, the majority of sampled loans were to married borrowers, aged 25-35, with housing expense-to-income ratios of 20-38%, debt-to-income ratios of 20-41%, and credit scores in the range of 620-740. As would be expected (Table 2) , among prepaid loans, the computed mean of the call option value at termination substantially exceeded that at time of loan origination. Owing to equity build-up over the loan period, the value of the put option at the time of loan origination (probability of negative equity) substantially exceeded that at time of loan termination.
III. Empirical Results
Our competing risks analysis is based on a stratified sample of FHA loan data provided by HUD. A weighting variable is used in the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) procedure to correct the possible sample selection bias. The weight addresses the choice-based sampling of mortgage files across race and loan status cells. More specifically, the weight is defined as the inverse of probability that the loan observation is being selected from a cell where it was sampled. 7 The competing risks of default and prepayment are estimated jointly. scores. Accordingly, the specification of Model 1 approximates that of most prior micro-data analyses of FHA mortgage default and provides a benchmark for the competing risks specifications discussed below. However, in contrast to most prior analyses, which were restricted to controls for local market conditions at the time of loan origination, Model 1 includes several time-varying proxies. 9 The time-varying covariates include SMSA level unemployment rates, log value of a Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of mortgage market concentration, and an interaction of black and Hispanic households and the Herfindahl Index terms. Model 2 extends
Model 1 by including the contemporaneous values of both the call and put options in both risk equations. Model 3 extends Model 2 by including the borrower's credit score information. In addition, the put and call values are interacted with borrower credit scores. All specifications also include a rich set of time-constant controls for borrower, loan, and locational determinants of exercise of the default and prepayment options. Overall, the competing risks models are well- 7 Here we assume that the sampling mechanism is independent of error distribution of the competing risks of FHA loan prepayment and default risks. 8 We also estimate these models using 100% SDA and PSA curves as our baselines for loan default and prepayment, respectively. The estimated parameters are robust to alternative specifications of baseline hazards functions. 9 For a recent micro-data based analysis of the FHA default experience, see Cotterman (2001).
specified and control for approximately 30 different characteristics of the loan, the borrower, and the census tract or area in which the property is located.
As evidenced in Model 1, estimation results indicate that increases in local unemployment rates negatively affect the exercise of the prepayment option but positively affect exercise of the default option. These results are highly significant across model specifications and are consistent with previous studies based on agency conforming loan data (see for example Deng, Quigley, and
The estimates from Model 1 suggest that the initial loan-to-value ratio is negatively associated with prepayment risk and positively associated with default risk. 10, 11 The estimated LTV coefficients are statistically significant across all model specifications. Higher levels of LTV may reflect in part borrower difficulties in loan re-qualification that diminish the exercise of the prepayment option. Model 1 also reports that prepayment likelihoods vary positively with mortgage expense burdens. An increase in the ratio of housing expense-to-income from below 20% to 20-38% and to in excess of 38% results in statistically significant increases in the likelihood of mortgage prepayment. However, results of the competing risk specifications (models 2 and 3) suggest that borrowers with housing expense-to-income ratios in the 20-38% range are most likely to prepay, whereas those with ratios below 20% or in excess of 38% are less likely to prepay. In contrast, borrower total debt-to-income burdens do not figure significantly in the exercise of prepayment options. In the competing risk model, neither the front-or back-end mortgage obligation ratio is significant in the exercise of the default option. Model 2 extends Model 1 through the introduction of the option-related time-varying covariates into both the prepayment and default equations. The call and put option controls are similar to those used by Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (1996) . Note, however, that the FHA data utilized herein enables a much richer specification of the competing risks than has been previously estimated using conventional loan data (see, for example, Deng, Quigley and Van
Order [1996, 2000] , and Van Order and Zorn [2001] ). The estimates confirm that the call option value is positive and highly significant in the exercise of the prepayment option; similarly, the value of the put option (probability of negative equity) also is positive and highly significant in the exercise of the default option. In other words, declines in mortgage interest rates that bring the call option "into-the-money" will lead to a high volume of prepayment activities, as is observed in the data in the sharp upward movement in mortgage prepayment activity in both 1993
and 1998. On the other hand, when the probability of negative equity becomes imminent, the incidence of default increases dramatically. These findings strongly support the predictions of option theory in explaining the exercise of default and prepayment options on the part of mortgage borrowers.
Model 2 further suggests that a higher probability of negative equity significantly reduces the risk of mortgage prepayment. Such an outcome is indeed plausible, in that households with poor equity positions may be less willing to exercise the refinance option owing to equity values that may be insufficient to refinance the remaining loan balance. On the other hand, the value of the call option exerts a significant positive influence on default propensities. This may be explained by the fact that when market rates drop, the value of call option increases, as does the market value of the mortgage. Relative to the market value of the outstanding balance of the loan, the underlying collateral (the house) is less valuable to the borrower so as to encourage borrower exercise of the default option. These findings are consistent with Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) . For the most part, the remaining estimated coefficients of Model 2 are robust to the inclusion of the call and put option values.
Model 3 extends Model 2 through the introduction of borrower credit scores into both the default and prepayment equations. The credit scores are entered in a nonlinear fashion roughly consistent with loan underwriting policy. As evidenced in Model 3, the credit score terms are statistically significant in the default equation. As would be expected, relative to the excluded highly credit qualified borrowers (credit score > 740), lower score borrowers are more likely to exercise the default option. On average, the default propensity of the middle qualified group (credit score in the 620-680 range) is almost twice as high as the more highly qualified group (score in the 680-740 range), whereas the default risks associated with the least qualified group (credit score below 620) are about 2.3 times higher than the group with score between 680-740.
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The credit score variables also are interacted with the time-varying estimates of the call and put options. As evidenced in Model 3 results, the interactive credit score and call option terms are positive and highly significant in the loan prepayment equation. Further, the estimated coefficients indicate more ruthless exercise of the call option among the most credit worthy borrowers. 19 Among borrowers with credit scores in excess of 740, for example, the influence of the call option value on prepayment propensities is about one-third higher than that of borrowers with credit scores below 620. The estimated interactions between credit scores and the call option proxy also underscore the relatively damped prepayment propensities of less credit worthy borrowers, even as that prepayment is "in the money". Similarly, the estimated coefficients on the interactive put option and credit score terms are positive and highly significant, suggesting a U-shaped relation with elevated propensities to default among both relatively low and high credit score borrowers. The estimated coefficients of the interactive put option and credit score variables also are negative and highly significant in the loan prepayment equation. Table 4 reports on the unadjusted cumulative probability of prepayment and default by various covariates and at the end of post-origination years one, three, and five. The unadjusted probabilities derive from the full sample of FHA loans. Overall, the data indicate very substantial upward movement in prepayment probabilities over the five years subsequent to mortgage origination; default propensities similarly are shown to move up perceptibly over that period.
The top panel reports on the cumulative probabilities of prepayment and default by borrower race. The data indicate elevated default probabilities as well as damped prepayment probabilities among black and Latino borrowers relative to white or Asian borrowers. As would be expected, the data also indicate substantially higher prepayment probabilities and similarly damped default probabilities among those borrowers with liquid assets in excess of median levels. Among other borrower and loan characteristics, elevated prepayment propensities are observed among loans with LTVs below 95 percent and housing expense-to-income ratios of 20-38 percent, and among repeat buyers. Those same borrower and loan categories are associated with relatively damped five-year cumulative default probabilities. Table 5 simulates the cumulative probabilities of prepayment and default by those borrower and loan characteristics identified in Table 4 . As in Table 4 , those probabilities are computed for one, three, and five years post loan origination. The simulations are based on a ten percent random sample of loans originated in June 1992. The baseline borrower is assumed to be a white household purchasing an existing suburban home with a 30-year fixed rate mortgage. The values of the other time-invariant control variables are set at their sample means, whereas time-varying covariates are set at their sample mean in each period. 20 Those covariates that are the focus of model simulation are specified in the table.
As would be expected, the 5-year cumulative probability of prepayment rises substantially with borrower credit worthiness (as reflected in borrower credit scores). That probability is 23 percent higher among borrowers with scores in excess of 680 than among those with scores below 620 ([45.67%-35 .22%]/45.67% = 23%). Among white borrowers, for example, the 5-year cumulative probability of prepayment of 43.22% is about 1-1/2 times the 29.64% rate estimated for similarly credit worthy blacks. Indeed, computation of cumulative prepayment rates by race and credit worthiness illustrates the strikingly lower prepayment propensities of black borrowers, relative to their white, Latino, and Asian counterparts. Likewise, cumulative default rates among black borrowers are estimated to be substantially in excess of those for other racial groups. At 5.3%, the 5-year cumulative default rate of highly credit worthy black borrowers is 36 percent higher ([5.30%-3.38%]/5.30% = 36%) than that of similarly qualified white borrowers.
We also simulated the cumulative probability of prepayment and default by initial loan-tovalue ratios. As would be expected, higher levels of credit risk serve both to elevate default likelihoods and to damp prepayment propensities. For example, as shown in Table 5 , at 5 years 20 Among time-invariant controls, for example, the simulation assumes two dependents per household. Further, the average loan-to-value ratio is set equal to 94 percent, whereas the log values of property value, household liquid assets, and family post loan origination, borrowers with high LTVs (LTVs ≥ 95%) are characterized by 1.5 times the default risk (3.86/2.99=1.3) of borrowers with lower LTVs. Also evident, however, are the substantially lower prepayment propensities of those high LTV borrowers; at 5 years post loan origination, the prepayment likelihoods of high LTV borrowers were 20 percent below those of lower LTV loans. A similar outcome is evidenced, for example, in the simulation of default and prepayment propensities among more or less credit worthy borrowers. At 5 years post loan origination, borrowers with lower credit scores (credit scores < 620) are characterized by 3-3/4 times the default risk (8.44/2.24= 3.77) of borrowers with higher credit scores. Those same lower credit score borrowers are characterized by damped prepayment risk relative to their higher credit score counterparts.
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The bottom rows of Table 5 provide simulations of default and prepayment propensities among more fully specified high-and low-credit risk borrowers. The precise specification of those borrower profiles is articulated in notes to Table 5 . In general, high credit risk borrowers are those with lower levels of liquid assets, poor credit scores, and more aggressively underwritten mortgages (as regards loan-to-value and payments-to-income ratios). With some limited nuance, lower credit risk borrowers are the opposite.
As is evidenced in Table 5 , loan performance behavior differs markedly over these borrower risk profiles. For example, by end of year 5 post loan origination, the simulated prepayment propensity of the lower credit risk borrower is about 21 percentage points higher than that of the higher credit risk borrower. However, lower credit risk borrowers are characterized by a 5-year cumulative default propensity that is about 8 percentage points lower than that of their higher income are set to 11.13, 8.54, and 8.00, respectively. These simulations further assume that the borrowers are married, firsttime buyers and that the loan interest rate is not subject to buy-down.
Other simulations suggest that by the end of year five post-origination, younger borrowers (age of household head is less than 25 years old) are characterized by 1.4 times the prepayment risks (46.98%/33.66%=1.4) of older households (age of household head greater than 45 years old). While the simulated risks of loan default similarly move up over the five-year period post origination, the differences between age groups is slight. Findings further suggest that the cumulative 5-year risk of prepayment is relatively higher among married couples (41%) than single females (38%). In marked contrast, the 5-year cumulative probability of default among single males is about 1.4 times (4.71%/3.45%=1.4) that of single females. We further find little quantitative variation in the cumulative probabilities of default across first-time buyer status. Results of these analyses are available from the authors upon request. credit risk counterparts. On net, results provide clear evidence of elevated total loan termination probabilities among the lower credit risk group.
The right-hand columns of Table 5 provide an assessment of total termination risks of FHAinsured mortgage loans. Those risks are defined as the sum of the default and prepayment propensities at the end of years 1, 3, and 5. Total loan terminations (from all sources) are relevant to the profitability of investment in FHA-insured mortgages. Typically, those loans not only are FHA-insured, but if pooled and sold also often are backed by a Ginnie Mae guarantee of timely repayment of principal and interest in the event of borrower default. Accordingly, from the perspective of the FHA-backed and Ginnie Mae insured loan investor, a loan termination via default is equivalent to that which derives from prepayment. Clearly, borrower groups with lower total loan termination risks represent more profitable loan investment opportunities, relative to those groups with higher total termination propensities.
As is evident in Table 5 , total loan termination risk is substantially elevated among lower credit risk borrowers. In that regard, total termination risk among low credit risk borrowers is about 32 percent ([54.72%-41 .53%]/41.53% = 32%) in excess of that of high credit risk borrowers. As is further apparent, the substantially elevated default probabilities among the high credit risk group are more than offset by the damped prepayment propensities, resulting in significantly lower loan termination propensities overall. Indeed, among high credit risk borrowers, loan termination probabilities via prepayment at the end of year 5 post origination are about 3.3 times that of loan termination propensities from default, while for low credit risk borrowers, prepayment probabilities at the end of year 5 post origination are about 33 times that of default probabilities. Clearly those loans originated among high credit risk borrowers are relatively more profitable to the investor, given their substantially depressed overall termination propensities.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
This paper applies micro-data from the FHA to estimate an option-based hazard model of the competing risks of mortgage default and prepayment. The empirical model derives from option theory and includes proxies for mortgage put and call options, borrower credit worthiness, lending market concentration, and numerous other contemporaneous and time-invariant borrower, loan, and locational controls. The estimated competing risks of prepayment and default are then used to simulate the potential risks to FHA mortgage lending as derive from various borrower characteristics, notably including those pertaining to borrower credit worthiness and race.
Results of the analysis strongly support the predictions of option theory in explaining the exercise of default and prepayment options among FHA mortgage borrowers. The estimates confirm that the call option value is positive and highly significant in the exercise of the prepayment option; similarly, the value of the put option (probability of negative equity) also is positive and highly significant in the exercise of the default option. Results further suggest that a higher probability of negative equity reduces the risk of mortgage prepayment. Such an outcome is indeed plausible, in that households with poor equity positions may be less willing to exercise the refinance option owing to equity values that may be insufficient to refinance the remaining loan balance.
Results further point to the importance of other borrower, loan, and market characteristics in the estimation of mortgage termination risks. For example, findings indicate reduced consumer refinance propensity in more concentrated and less competitive loan markets. Among FHA borrowers, the initial loan-to-value ratio is negatively associated with prepayment propensity and positively associated with default propensity. As would be expected, higher credit score borrowers are less likely to exercise the default option, whereas lower credit score borrowers are less likely to prepay. In that regard, the 5-year cumulative probability of prepayment is 23 percent higher among borrowers with scores in excess of 680 than among those with scores below 620. Relative to white borrowers, estimates suggest that black and Hispanic borrowers are statistically less likely to prepay. Indeed, computation of cumulative prepayment rates by race and credit worthiness illustrates the strikingly lower prepayment propensities of black borrowers, relative to their white, Latino, and Asian counterparts.
Overall, results indicate the appropriateness of the competing risk specification and indicate the importance of slower prepayment speeds among higher risk borrowers. As is evidenced, the substantially elevated default probabilities of higher credit risk borrowers are more than offset by their damped prepayment propensities, resulting in significantly lower loan termination propensities overall. Indeed, among high credit risk borrowers, at 5 years post loan origination, loan termination probabilities via prepayment are about 3.3 times those emanating from loan default, while for low credit risk borrowers, prepayment probabilities at the end of year 5 post origination are about 33 times that of default probabilities. For the investor in FHA-insured mortgage pools, the estimated 5-year cumulative probability of mortgage termination among high default risk and minority borrowers is only about three-fourths that of low-default risk and nonminority borrowers, respectively. Recognition of this mortgage performance advantage should enhance the willingness of lenders and investors to originate and acquire such loans and at more competitive pricing. Findings suggest that the extension of mortgage credit to less credit-worthy and underserved borrowers, in a manner consistent with their lower termination risks, would serve to advance both their homeownership opportunities and related federal housing policy objectives. Note: T-ratios are in parentheses. All models are estimated by ML approach. Prepayment and default functions are considered as correlated competing risks and they are estimated jointly. Flexible baseline functions (following Han and Hausman, 1990) for prepayment and default are estimated simultaneously with the competing risks hazard functions. Note: The calculation of probability for each risk group is based on 10% random sample of the mortgage pools originated in June 1992. For each group, probabilities are evaluated at the mean value of each covariate (time-varying means are calculated for time-varying covariates) except for those specified in each risk category such that (1) Liquid asset is evaluated at 75% and 25% quartiles of the sample for higher and lower liquid asset groups, respectively.
(2) LTV is set to 95% , and 80% for high LTV category, and low LTV category, respectively. (3) Weighted average of borrowers with credit score between 680 and 740, and credit score above 740 is used to define high credit score group; and weighted average of borrowers with credit below 620 is used to define low credit score group. (4) The low credit risk group consists of borrowers with liquid asset above sample median, LTV under 95%, repeat-buyer, housing expense to income ratio between 20% and 38%, and credit score above 680. (5) The high credit risk group consists of borrowers with liquid asset below sample median, LTV above 95%, first-time buyer, housing expense to income ratio greater than 38% , and credit score under 620. (6) The cumulative probabilities of total termination at the end of year 1, 3, and 5 are the sum of predicted cumulative prepayment and default rates at the end of year 1, 3, and 5, respectively. APPENDIX A Note: T-ratios are in parentheses. All models are estimated by ML approach. Prepayment and default functions are considered as correlated competing risks and they are estimated jointly. Flexible baseline functions (following Han and Hausman, 1990) for prepayment and default are estimated simultaneously with the competing risks hazard functions.
